Zero Knowledge Proof: Difference between revisions
Created page with "To prove a character set belongs to a string without revealing the set, you use *Zero-Knowledge Proofs* (ZKPs), specifically techniques like zk-SNARKs/STARKs or specialized commitment schemes (e.g., Merkle Trees, Pedersen Commitments) to generate a short proof that a commitment to the string and the set satisfies the "all characters in set" condition, verifiable with a public key/verifier, all without disclosing the actual characters of the string or set, only proving th..." |
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To prove a character set belongs to a string without revealing the set, you use | To prove a character set belongs to a string without revealing the set, you use '''Zero-Knowledge Proofs''' (ZKPs), specifically techniques like zk-SNARKs/STARKs or specialized commitment schemes (e.g., Merkle Trees, Pedersen Commitments) to generate a short proof that a commitment to the string and the set satisfies the "all characters in set" condition, verifiable with a public key/verifier, all without disclosing the actual characters of the string or set, only proving their relationship. | ||
Core Idea: Commitment and Proof | ==Core Idea: Commitment and Proof== | ||
Commitment Phase (Prover): | ===Commitment Phase (Prover):=== | ||
The Prover creates a cryptographic commitment (a one-way hash-like value) for the secret string and another for the secret character set. | The Prover creates a cryptographic commitment (a one-way hash-like value) for the secret string and another for the secret character set. | ||
They then compute a ZKP that mathematically links these commitments, proving: "If you hash these (revealed) values, they match my secret commitments, AND all characters from my secret set are indeed present in my secret string." | They then compute a ZKP that mathematically links these commitments, proving: "If you hash these (revealed) values, they match my secret commitments, AND all characters from my secret set are indeed present in my secret string." | ||
Verification Phase (Verifier): | ===Verification Phase (Verifier):=== | ||
The Verifier receives the commitments and the ZKP. | The Verifier receives the commitments and the ZKP. | ||
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They run a verification algorithm using public parameters. If the proof is valid, they are convinced the condition holds, without ever seeing the string or set itself. | They run a verification algorithm using public parameters. If the proof is valid, they are convinced the condition holds, without ever seeing the string or set itself. | ||
Example with Merkle Trees (Conceptual) | ==Example with Merkle Trees (Conceptual)== | ||
Prover: Has string S ("banana") and set C ({'a', 'b', 'n'}). | Prover: Has string S ("banana") and set C ({'a', 'b', 'n'}). | ||
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Verifier: Checks the ZKP against the roots. | Verifier: Checks the ZKP against the roots. | ||
Key Technologies | ==Key Technologies== | ||
zk-SNARKs/STARKs: Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (or Scalable TAs). These generate very small proofs and have efficient verification, ideal for proving complex properties about data without revealing it. | zk-SNARKs/STARKs: Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (or Scalable TAs). These generate very small proofs and have efficient verification, ideal for proving complex properties about data without revealing it. | ||
Latest revision as of 08:53, 12 December 2025
To prove a character set belongs to a string without revealing the set, you use Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), specifically techniques like zk-SNARKs/STARKs or specialized commitment schemes (e.g., Merkle Trees, Pedersen Commitments) to generate a short proof that a commitment to the string and the set satisfies the "all characters in set" condition, verifiable with a public key/verifier, all without disclosing the actual characters of the string or set, only proving their relationship.
Core Idea: Commitment and Proof
Commitment Phase (Prover):
The Prover creates a cryptographic commitment (a one-way hash-like value) for the secret string and another for the secret character set. They then compute a ZKP that mathematically links these commitments, proving: "If you hash these (revealed) values, they match my secret commitments, AND all characters from my secret set are indeed present in my secret string."
Verification Phase (Verifier):
The Verifier receives the commitments and the ZKP.
They run a verification algorithm using public parameters. If the proof is valid, they are convinced the condition holds, without ever seeing the string or set itself.
Example with Merkle Trees (Conceptual)
Prover: Has string S ("banana") and set C ({'a', 'b', 'n'}).
Commit to String: Build a Merkle Tree for S, get its root MerkleRoot(S).
Commit to Set: Represent C as a sorted string/structure, build its Merkle Tree, get MerkleRoot(C).
Generate Proof: Create a proof (e.g., using a polynomial commitment like KZG or PLONK) that shows MerkleRoot(S) and MerkleRoot(C) are related such that every element in C is in S. This involves creating a polynomial that evaluates to zero if the condition holds.
Send to Verifier: Send MerkleRoot(S), MerkleRoot(C), and the ZKP.
Verifier: Checks the ZKP against the roots.
Key Technologies
zk-SNARKs/STARKs: Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (or Scalable TAs). These generate very small proofs and have efficient verification, ideal for proving complex properties about data without revealing it.
Pedersen Commitments: A basic commitment scheme where you commit to values, allowing proofs that committed values sum up correctly. This approach transforms "proving inclusion" into a mathematical problem solved by advanced cryptography, ensuring privacy while verifying correctness.
